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Chapter 3
Financial Illiteracy, Education, and
Retirement Saving
B. Douglas Bernheim
Most Americans save too little to maintain their standards of living after
retirement. In the past, the typical worker has reached retirement with
total savings insufficient to sustain his or her preretirement living stan-
dards (Diamond 1977; Hammermesh 1984).1 Since social security bene-
fits provide rather modest earnings replacement, and since defined ben-
efit plans supplement this income for a shrinking minority of American
workers, retirement income security has become increasingly dependent
on the adequacy of personal saving. Yet recent research on the adequacy
of saving has found that, through the combination of defined contribu-
tion plans and nonpension saving, the typical baby boom household is
saving at slightly more than one-third the rate required to finance a
standard ofliving during retirement comparable to the standard ofliving
that it enjoys before retirement (Bernheim 1993, 1994a, 1995a; Arthur D.
Little, Inc. 1993).2 Even workers with defined benefit plans fall short of
the mark. 3 It is important to emphasize that this calculation does not rep-
resent a "worst case" scenario. On the contrary, it is based on many opti-
mistic assumptions concerning longevity, future rates of taxation, and
anticipated social security benefits.' Even a moderate increase in future
taxes would reduce relative saving adequacy below 30 percent, and a
moderate reduction in social security benefits would depress it even fur-
ther, to less than 20 percent. If social security benefits were eliminated,
baby boomers would be saving only about one-tenth ofwhat is required to
avoid a precipitous decline in standard ofliving after retirement.
The increasing popularity of 401 (k) accentuates these concerns, be-
cause it leaves critical decisions concerning participation, contributions,
and investments in the hands of employees. Many employees choose to
contribute little, or nothing at all, while others invest heavily in safe, low-
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return, fixed income funds. As a result, fewer than one-third of pension
plan sponsors believe that their employees will accumulate adequate plan
balances."
Why do Americans make such poor financial decisions? One possibility
is that they lack the training, skill, and!or guidance to recognize finan-
cial vulnerabilities and to formulate prudent plans. Ifso, then education
policy may prove to be a powerful tool for stimulating rates of saving-
particularly as 401 (k) plans continue to grow. This possibility led the
Department of Labor in 1995 to launch a "national pension education
program aimed at drawing the attention of American workers to the
importance of taking personal responsibility for their retirement se-
curity" (Berg 1995). The desire to shape behavior through education is
also presumably behind the recent explosion of retirement education in
the workplace. As of 1994, 88 percent of large employers offered some
form of financial education, more than two-thirds of which added these
programs after 1990.6
In this chapter, I examine a series of questions central to the issues
discussed above. First, is low saving associated with a failure to appreciate
financial vulnerabilities? Second, even if individuals were aware of their
vulnerabilities, would they typically possess the decision-making skills re-
quired to formulate sensible retirement plans? Third, when the requisite
decision-making skills are absent, do individuals obtain authoritative ad-
vice and guidance? Finally, iflow saving and poor investment choices are
attributable in part to the absence of knowledge, skill, and guidance, is it
possible to address these problems effectively through programs of retire-
ment education, particularly in the workplace?
In answering these questions, I review existing evidence and, where
appropriate, offer pertinent new evidence. Many of my conclusions are
pessimistic: the typical household decision-maker underappreciates fi-
nancial vulnerabilities, is ill equipped to formulate sensible retirement
plans, and does not make significant use of authoritative guidance. How-
ever, I ultimately find considerable cause for optimism in the emerging
body of evidence on the effects of employer-based retirement education.
Do Households Appreciate Their Financial
Vulnerabilities?
The extent to which households perceive their financial vulnerabilities,
and the relation between these perceptions and accumulated wealth, is
revealed through an analysis of annual household survey data gathered
by Merrill Lynch, Inc. The first of these surveys was administered in two
"waves" during the fall of 1993 to a random, nationally representative
sample of individuals between the ages of 29 and 47 (the "baby boom"
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cohort). Both waves contain a detailed battery of questions concerning
household assets, earnings, income, pension coverage, employment sta-
tus, and demographic information. The first wave, which surveyed 1,209
households, also contains various self-assessments of current financial
status and of future financial needs, intended saving, and actual saving.
Additionally, it measures beliefs and expectations concerning Social Se-
curity, including current and future benefit levels, and other information
on attitudes and expectations concerning unfunded government obliga-
tions. The second wave, which surveyed 806 households, assesses eco-
nomic literacy, financial knowledge, developmental experiences that
may be relevant to financial behavior, and sources of financial informa-
tion and advice.?
The 1993 survey instrument contains several questions designed to
elicit self-evaluations of financial status. These questions include the
following:
Would you describe the state of your own personal finances these days as very
shaky, fairly shaky, fairly secure, or very secure?
Overall, how well prepared do you think you are financially for your eventual
retirement? (very well prepared, somewhat prepared, somewhat unprepared,
very unprepared, or not prepared at all)
Do you expect to have a standard ofliving that is much worse, somewhat worse,
somewhat better, much better, or have the same standard ofliving after you retire
as you do today?
Overall, the answers to these questions indicate a fairly high degree of
optimism about personal finances: 68 percent of respondents described
their personal finances as fairly secure or very secure, 58 percent believed
that they are very well prepared or somewhat prepared for retirement,
while only 19 percent described themselves as very unprepared or not at
all prepared. Virtually identical fractions of the population (31 percent)
expected better and worse standards ofliving in retirement.
Provided that we have some objective measure of financial vulner-
abilities, the answers to questions about personal financial status can be
used to evaluate the extent to which individuals recognize these vul-
nerabilities. One possible measure of financial vulnerabilities is the ratio
of wealth to earnings.B A lower value of the wealth-ta-earnings ratio does
not, however, necessarily indicate greater vulnerability. A particular value
of this ratio may indicate vulnerability for households with certain char-
acteristics, while indicating relative security for households with other
characteristics.
I therefore separate the population into four "adjusted-wealth" quar-
tiles (Bernheim 1995b). In tuitively, this approach amounts to dividing
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TABLE I Perceptions of Financial Security versus Household Financial
Preparation
Index ojfinancial preparedness
(quartiles) (%)
1 2 3 4
State ojpersonalfinances
Secure I fairly secure 53.9 71.0 66.4 78.3
ShakyIvery shaky 46.1 28.6 33.7 21.7
State ojpreparationJor retirement
Very weillsomewhat 44.6 55.2 62.0 68.2
Very unprepared I not at all 29.9 9.5 13.0 14.3
Standard ojliving during retirement
BetterI much better 29.9 28.6 29.8 36.4
Worse/much worse 37.3 32.9 31.7 23.0
Source: Bernheim (I995b). The sample is ",ken from the 1993 Merrill Lynch household
surve)'.
Nole: The "index of financial preparedness" is based on the ratio of wealth to earnings,
adjusting for other household characteristics. Households falling into the first quartile have
the lowest level of financial preparedness (relative to similar households), while house-
holds falling into the fourth quartile have the highest level of financial preparedness.
the population into numerous subgroups based on age, earnings, gen-
der, marital status, education, pension coverage, and number ofchildren
and then further subdividing each of the groups into quartiles based on
wealth-to-earnings ratios. The first, or lowest, adjusted-wealth quartile
corresponds to those individuals in the lowest wealth-to-earnings quar-
tile within each population subgroup. Those individuals in the lowest
adjusted-wealth quartile thus have very low levels of wealth compared to
other individuals with identical characteristics. The other three adjusted-
wealth quartiles are defined similarly.9
A household's adjusted-wealth quartile is a good measure of its finan-
cial vulnerability, relative to that of similar households. If individuals
understand their financial vulnerabilities, then those in higher adjusted-
wealth quartiles should regard themselves as mOre secure than those in
lower adjusted-wealth quartiles.
Table I examines this possibility, reporting answers to survey questions
concerning household financial status, separately for each adjusted-
wealth quartile. The table exhibits a moderately strong relation between
actual and perceived financial vulnerability. The fraction of the popula-
tion that regards its personal finances as secure or fairly secure rises
significantly between the first and second adjusted-wealth quartiles, as
well as between the third and fourth quartiles. Oddly, this fraction de-
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clines slightly between the second and third quartiles. The fraction of the
population describing itself as very well or somewhat prepared for re-
tirement rises monotonically with the household's adjusted-wealth quar-
tile. The respondent's expected relative standard of living in retirement
shows the weakest relationship to adjusted wealth. The fraction of the
population expecting a better standard of living in retiremen t is highest
in the top adjusted-wealth quartile, but varies little across the first three
quartiles. On the other hand, the fraction of the population expecting a
worse standard of living in retirement falls significantly between the first
and second quartiles, and again between the third and fourth quartiles.
(There is also a slight decline between the second and third quartiles.)
Although these results indicate some awareness of relative financial
vulnerabilities, they also exhibit an unrealistic degree of optimism.
Within the lowest adjusted-wealth quartile - a group that is poorly pre-
pared by any objective measure of adequacy - more than half of the
respondents (54%) regard their personal finances as secure or fairly
secure, 45 percent believe that they are very well or somewhat prepared
for retirement, and only 37 percent expect to achieve a lower standard of
living after retirement.
To put these findings somewhat differently, among the least well-
prepared segment of the population, nearly two-thirds believe that their
standard of living during retirement will be as high or higher than it is
today. This is particularly surprising in light of the fact that most of these
individuals acknowledge that they save significantly less than they should
and express little or no confidence in Social Security (Bernheim 1995b).
Thus, for a substantial fraction of the population, the failure to save
adequately may result in a failure to appreciate financial vulnerabibties
adequately, coupled with possible self-deception.
Do Households Have Adequate Decision-Making Skills?
The existing literature contains a fair number ofstudies that shed consid-
erable light on the general public's level of financial sophistication. So-
phistication, or the lack thereof, is reflected in both knowledge and
choices.
Collectively, existing studies paint a rather bleak picture of Americans'
economic and financial literacy. to For example, only 20 percent of adults
can determine correct change using prices from a menu, and many have
trouble determining whether a mortgage at 8.6 percent is better than a
mortgage at 8% percent.
The sophistication of choices has also been the subject of extensive
study. Numerous authors have observed that decision making under un-
certainty gives rise to a variety of behavioral anomalies (Kahneman,
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Siovic, and Tversky 1982). A large number of papers provide formal tests
of rational intenemporal choice, with many authors concluding that the
life cycle model does not accurately describe behavior (Shefrin and
Thaler 1983, 1988; Levin 1992; KotIikoff,johnson, and Samuelson 1987).
Numerous authors have also identified particularly naive or unsophis-
ticated patterns of financial behavior. Examples include: a widespread
failure to take advantage of clear arbitrage opportunities (Warshawsky
1987); the common practice of waiting until the end of a tax year to con-
tribute to an IRA (Feenberg and Skinner 1989); the use of rough rule-
of-thumb saving targets (Bernheim 1994b); the frequency of identifiable
errors in personal financial management, including insufficient diversifi-
cation and excessive conservatism in selecting investments (O'Neill 1990,
1993); limited familiarity with all but the simplest investment instru-
ments (O'Neill 1993); the use of costly methods of borrowing (Hira
1993); the frequency with which personal bankruptcy results from poor
credit management (Hira 1993); the prevalence of "compulsive spend-
ing addictions" (Faber and O'Guinn 1989); and the high frequency with
which individuals fall prey to financial scams (Alliance Against Fraud in
Telemarketing 1992).
In summary, the existing literature demonstrates that most Americans
know little about managing personal finances and their choices reflect
this ignorance. While these findings are useful and important, they leave
many central questions unanswered. In particular, it is important to know
whether iden tifiable population subgroups are particularly at risk ofmak-
ing uninformed or otherwise unsophisticated decisions, and whether
this lack of information and sophistication relates systematically to
behavior.
In this section, [address these issues using information collected in the
1993 Merrill Lynch household survey. The survey instrument contained
eleven questions designed to assess the respondent's knowledge of eco-
nomic matters. These questions are reproduced in the appendix. I have
divided the questions into two subcategories: those that concern finan-
cial issues, and those that concern macroeconomic issues. These permit
us to examine (1) overall performance on these test questions, (2) varia-
tion in relative knowledge over identifiable population subgroups, (3) in-
dividuals' awareness of their own sophistication, and (4) preliminary
findings concerning the relation between knowledge and behavior.
An Analysis ofAbsolute Performance
The sample of respondents surveyed generally performed poorly on eco-
nomic and financial test questions. This is consistent with the evidence
reviewed at the outset of this section. Even allowing for an appropriate
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margin of error on certain questions (such as the Dow Jones average),
more than 80 percent of the sample answered at least five of the eleven
questions incorrectly.
It is possible LO characterize the nature of financial illiteracy more
precisely. Nearly twa-thirds of the sample would not hazard a guess as to
the level of the Dow Jones average, despite the fact that this number is
reported on the front page of virtually every business section in every
daily newspaper, as well as on ,~rtuallyevery national television and radio
news program. The median answer for those professing knowledge was
3,400 - more than 300 points below the true range of the average during
the week of the survey.
More than 90 percent of the sample answered the questions concern-
ing unemployment and inflation, but they overestimated both statistics.
The median response concerning unemployment was 8 percent, com-
pared to 6.7 percent nationally at the time of the survey, and roughly one-
third named a figure of 10 percent or higher. Similarly, the median re-
sponse concerning inflation was 4 percent, compared to a rate of 2.8
percent at the time of the survey.
Respondents severely underestimated the size of the federal debt,
with one-third of the sample reporting a number below $1 trillion.
Among those answering this question, the median response was $3 tril-
lion, whereas the correct answer was nearly $4.4 trillion. This discrepancy
may be partially attributable to confusion about the differences between
the debt and the deficit, as well as to inadvertent errors in orders of
magnitude (i.e., saying "billions" rather than "trillions"). The survey
separately asked for the federal debt per household. In theory, this num-
ber is far more relevant to the typical taxpayer than the total federal debt,
since it measures the amount of liabilities that the government has in-
curred on his or her behalf. It is therefore striking- but perhaps not too
surprising- that respondents were far more ignorant of the federal debt
per household. Whereas 17 percent professed ignorance of the federal
debt, more than one-third, or nearly twice as many, would not hazard a
guess as to the federal debt per household. Those answering the question
on debt per household severely underestimated this liability. The median
answer was $18,000, compared with an actual liability of $45,700.
As noted in other studies, individuals tend to underestimate the power
of compound interest. Nearly one-third of the sample indicated that
$1,000, left in the bank for 30 years at 8 percent interest, would earn
less than $5,000, whereas the correct answer is more than $10,000.
Many respondents also poorly understand common financial instru-
ments. Roughly 42 percent could not identify the proper explanation for
the difference in average returns between mutual funds and federally
insured CDs.
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Respondents did perform relatively well on a small number of ques-
tions. The median response concerning the national minimum wage was
$4.35 - only $0.1 0 high - and 34 percent of the sample said $4.25. Most
respondents also provided reasonably accurate answers to the question
about conventional mortgage rates, with homeowners performing no-
ticeably better than renters.
An Analysis of Relative Performance
Despite these rather stark findings, it is difficult to obtain a meaningful
absolute measure of financial literacy, since any such measure is neces-
sarily predicated on subjective judgments concerning the set of things
that a well-informed household ought to know. Test questions, such as
those contained in the Merrill Lynch survey, are best suited for evaluating
the relative sophistication of different population subgroups. For this
purpose, I depart from the standard practice of coding responses as
simply "right" or "wrong." These binary measures are necessarily arbi-
trary; for example, how close to the actual Dow Jones average would an
answer need to be to be scored as correct? Instead, I assign a "relative
knowledge score" to each question. This score is defined as the fraction
of the population who gave answers that were further in absolute value
than the respondent's answer from the true answer. ll This procedure has
the additional benefit of normalizing the score on each question to re-
flect difficulty, so that no question (or group ofquestions) dominates the
variation in total scores.
Average scores for different population subgroups appear in Table 2.
To interpret differences in test scores between subgroups, it is helpful to
keep in mind the following information. Scores range between 25.8 and
96.5, with 25 percent of the population scoring between 25.8 and 54.2, 25
percent between 54.2 and 64.2, 25 percent between 64.2 and 73.5, and 25
percent above 73.5. Thus, toward the central portion of the population
distribution, a 10 point increase in an individual's score would move him
or her past roughly one-quarter of the population.
Surprisingly, test scores do not rise or fall systematically with age. This
may reflect the effects of various offsetting factors. For example, individ-
uals both acquire new knowledge and forget old knowledge as they age. It
is also important to keep in mind that all respondents were surveyed at
roughly the same point in time. As a result, I cannot separately identify
the effects of age and birth year. Younger cohorts may have received
more - or less - financial training than older cohorts.
Several other clear patterns emerge from an examination of Table 2.
Males score higher than females, and whites score higher than blacks.
Due to the size of the sample, it was impossible to draw reliable inferences
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TABLE 2 Average Normalized Scores from a Test of Economic and Financial
Knowledge
Popuwtion Overall Financial Macroeconomic
subgroup score score scare
Age
29-34 63.5 70.1 55.7
35-40 63.1 69.8 55.0
41-47 64.2 70.6 56.6
Gender
Male 68.5 74.0 62.0
Female 58.9 66.5 49.8
Race
White 64.3 71.0 56.3
Black 55.9 62.0 48.6
Education
College degree 68.3 74.8 60.4
No college degree 60.6 67.2 52.8
Earnings
First quartile 59.4 65.8 51.8
Second quartile 64.1 69.9 57.2
Third quartile 65.5 72.4 57.1
Fourth quartile 67.3 74.2 59.0
Source: Author's calculations. Sample taken from the 1993 Merrill Lynch household survey.
Note: Test scores are normalized to lie on a scale of 0 to 1DO, based on relative performance.
for any other ethnic subgroup; indeed, even the sample of black respon-
dents is relatively small, and a corresponding measure ofcaution is there-
fore warranted when evaluating differences between blacks and whites.
Average scores rise with both education and income, although perhaps
not by as much as one might expect.
Similar patterns are observed for overall scores, financial scores, and
macroeconomic scores. This reflects the fact that financial and macro-
economic scores are very highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is
quite large - 0.51- and highly statistically significant). This is reassur-
ing, since it suggests that the questions are consistently measuring under-
lying characteristics.
One must exercise considerable caution when interpreting any of the
patterns described above. For example, since earnings, education, gen-
der, and race are all correlated, it is impossible to discern from any given
comparison whether one is observing the incremental effect of changing
the characteristic in question. Proper interpretation of the data requires
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TABLE 3 Regression Analysis of Normalized Scores from a Test of Economic and
Financial Knowledge
Explanatory Dependent variable
variable Overall score Financial score Macroeconomic score
Age/l0' 0.464 -2.27 3.74
(8.44) (8.90) (11.4)
Gender 0.0800 0.0580 0.106
(0.0094)* (0.0099)* (0.013)'
Black -0.0561 -0.0576 -0.0544
(0.0232)t (0.0245)t (0.0315)
Earnings/IO' 1.39 3.19 -0.775
(0.89) (0.91) * (1.17)
Employment status 0.0278 0.0261 0.0298
(0.0139)t (0.0147) (0.0188)
High school only 0.0290 0.0409 0.0146
(0.0289) (0.0302) (0.0388)
High school plus 0.0746 0.0848 0.0624
(no college degree) (0.0283)* (0.0299)* (0.0383)
College degree 0.111 0.122 0.0977
(0.028)* (0.030)* (0.0384)*
Constant 0.494 0.562 0.414
(0.043)* (0.046) * (0.059)*
Source: Author's calculations. Sample taken from the 1993 Merrill Lynch household survey.
*Denotes statistical significance at 1% level.
tDenotes statistical significance at 5% level.
Note: Forthe purpose of this table, the dependent variables (test scores) are normalized to a
scale of 0 to I, rather than 0 to 100 (as for Table 2). Estimates are based on ordinary least
squares regression. Standard errors are in parentheses.
the estimation of equations that explain test scores as a function of many
demographic and economic factors.
Regression results are presented in Table 3. With respect to overall test
scores, virtually all the patterns noted in Table 2 hold up. There is no
systematic relation between test performance and age. Differences based
on gender and race are statistically significant, even holding other vari-
ables (such as education and earnings) constant. More educated individ-
uals generally obtain higher scores, and these differences are also statis-
tically significant. Higher earnings are also associated with higher test
scores, even controlling for education (as well as the other explanatory
variables), but this effect is not statistically significant at conventional
levels. In Table 3, I have also controlled for employment status, on the
theory that gainfully employed individuals may be more knowledgeable
about economic matters. Indeed, the estimates bear this out.
Further insight is obtained by examining results for financial knowl-
edge and macroeconomic knowledge separately. These results are nearly
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identical, with one important exception: financial scores rise with earn-
ings, and this increase is statistically significant, whereas earnings have es-
sentially no effect on macroeconomic scores. Although macroeconomic
scores are correlated with earnings (Table 2), this correlation disappears
once one controls for education, gender, race, and employment status.
This finding is intuitive. Individuals with higher earnings almost certainly
have greater incentives to acquire financial knowledge. For example,
those who are able to purchase homes are more likely to follow move-
ments in mortgage rates, and those who own stock are certainly more
likely to follow the DowJones average. Thus, it is not surprising that I find
a very strong positive relation between earnings and financial test scores,
even when I control for education and other factors. However, those with
greater resources do not necessarily have greater incentives to acquire
macroeconomic information. Indeed, those with fewer resources are
more vulnerable to unemployment and may therefore may pay more at-
tention to employment statistics. Likewise, they may be more concerned
about the minimum wage, and at least as worried about inflation. Thus, it
is not surprising that, once one controls for education and other factors,
there is essen tially no relation between earnings and macroeconomic test
scores. This observation features prominently in the analysis below.
An Analysis of Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge
The 1993 Merrill Lynch household survey also contained an additional
question designed to elicit a self-assessment of financial literacy. Specifi-
cally, respondents were asked:
Do you consider yourself very financially knowledgeable, somewhat financially
knowledgeable, only a little financially knowledgeable, or not at all financially
knowledgeable?
Answers to this question reflect a blend of actual knowledge and self-
confidence. It is therefore of interest to evaluate the accuracy of self-
assessments by comparing them with test scores, and to examine system-
atic differences in self-assessments across population subgroups.
Table 4 provides average test scores (overall, financial, and macro-
economic) bmken down by self-assessments of financial knowledge.
This table reveals a strong correlation between self-assessments and test
scores. Nevertheless, this correlation is, perhaps, less pronounced than
one might imagine. The average overall score among those pronouncing
themselves "very financially knowledgeable" was 67.1, corresponding to
the 57th percentile, whereas the average overall score among those de-
scribing themselves as "not at all financially knowledgeable" was 58.9,
corresponding to the 38th percentile. It is noteworthy that those who are,
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TABLE 4 Mean Normalized Scores from a Test of Economic and Financial
Knowledge versus Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge
Mean norrrulliz.ed score
Overall Financial Macroeconomic
Selfasse.<.<ed knowledge score score score
Very financially knowledgeable 67.1 73.5 59.4
Somewhat financially knowledgeable 64.2 70.8 56.3
Only a little financially 59.7 65.9 52.3
knowledgeable
Not at all financially knowledgeable 58.9 68.2 47.7
Source: Author's calculations. Sample taken from 'he 1993 Merrill Lynch household survey.
Nole: Test scores are normalized to lie on a scale oCO to 100. based on relative performance.
by their own account, "not at all financially knowledgeable" actuallyob-
tained a higher average financial score than those who called themselves
"only a little financially knowledgeable." In contrast, the average mac-
roeconomic score rises monotonically with self-assessed knowledge. This
observation raises the possibility that self-assessments of financial knowl-
edge might actually reflect macroeconomic knowledge more closely than
financial knowledge. I return to this issue below.
Table 5 provides summary statistics for self-assessed knowledge for vari-
ous population subgroups. For each subgroup, I report the fraction of
respondents describing themselves as either "very financially knowledge-
able" or "somewhat financially knowledgeable." Most of the patterns
here are similar to those noted for test scores (Table 2). There is no
apparent relation between age and self-assessed financial knowledge; the
youngest and oldest baby boomers consider themselves equally well in-
formed on financial matters. Males generally believe themselves to be
more financially knowledgeable than females, and self-assessed financial
knowledge rises with education and earnings. There are, however, some
notable differences between the patterns exhibited in Tables 2 and 5.
The quantitative impact of gender, education, and earnings are very sim-
ilar in Table 2 (test scores). For example, average overall scores for males
and females differ by 9.6 points, scores for those with and without college
degrees differ by 7.7 points, and scores for those in the top and bottom
earnings quartiles differ by 7.9 points. In contrast, the relation between
self-assessed knowledge and earnings is much more pronounced than
the relation between self-assessed knowledge and education, which is in
turn more pronounced than the relation between self-assessed knowl-
edge and gender. Specifically, the difference between the summary statis-
tics reported for those in the top and bottom earnings quartiles in Table 3
is 0.201, compared to a difference of only 0.109 for those with and with-
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TABLE 5 Demographic Patterns in Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge
Population subgroup
Age
29-34
35-40
41-47
Gender
Male
Female
Race
White
Black
Education
College degree
No college degree
Earnings
First quartile
Second quartile
Third quartile
Fourth quartile
Percent consid£ring themselves either
somewhat or very financially knowledgeable
80.2
78.6
80.1
83.6
75.8
80.2
78.8
86.3
75.4
70.1
75.7
79.8
90.2
Source: AUlhor'scalculations. Sample taken from me 1993 Merrill Lynch Household Survey.
out college degrees, and a difference of 0.078 between men and women.
In addition, there is practically no difference in self-assessed financial
knowledge between whites and blacks, despite the differences in test
scores noted in Table 2.
Of course, these preliminary observations are based on simple correla-
tions. Estimates of probit specifications explaining high self-reported
financial knowledge are presented in Table 6. The central patterns ob-
served in Table 5 are unchanged: men have higher self-assessed knowl-
edge than women; self-assessed knowledge is essentially unrelated to
race, but rises with education. Notably, self-assessed knowledge is strongly
related to earnings. Recall that, once other variables are controlled for,
financial test scores are strongly related to earnings, while macroeco-
nomic test scores are not. In this important respect, self-assessed financial
knowledge behaves more like financial test scores than like macroeco-
nomic test scores.
A comparison of the results in Tables 3 and 6 reveals that our explana-
tory variables affect test scores differently than they affect self-assessed
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TABLE 6 Probit Regression Analysis, Explaining High Self-Assessed Financial
Knowledge
Explanatory variable Coefficient
Age/104
Gender
Black
Earnings/10'
Employment status
High school only
High school plus
(no college degree)
College degree
Constant
0.482
(1.04)
0.293
(0.116)*
0.0913
(0.280)
66.6
(21.0) 1
0.0968
(0.160)
1.06
(0.309) t
1.16
(0.305)1
1.34
(0.309)
-1.07
(0.505)*
Source: Author's calculations. Sample taken from the 1993 Merrill Lynch Household Survey.
Note: Estimates are based on a probit regression. which explains the probability that self-
assessed financial knowledge is high. The dependent variable is set equal to 1 when self-
assessed financial knowledge is high, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in paren-
theses.
*Denotes statistical significance at5% level.
tDenOles statistical significance at I% level.
knowledge. Under the obviously debatable assumption that test scores
accurately measure economic and financial knowledge,'2 this suggests
that certain population subgroups may systematically overestimate or
underestimate their financial sophistication. Young baby boomers are no
more likely to be excessively or insufficiently confident than older baby
boomers. The most obvious candidates for overconfidence include those
with high earnings, those with high school diplomas, the nonworking,
and blacks (alternatively, low earners, those not finishing high school,
workers, and whites may be underconfident). College-educated individ-
uals and women may also, on average, be overconfident in their financial
sophistication.
The Relation Between Saving and Financial Knowledge.
Thus far, I have argued that many individuals are relatively ignorant of
economic and financial matters, that they underappreciate their finan-
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TABLE 7 Knowledge and Retirement Savings
Stock ojretirement savings as %
ojannual earnings
Median Mean
Test SCOTe quartile
4
3
2
Self-assessed financial knowUidge
Very
Somewhat
Only a little bit
Not at all
37.6
28.3
22.2
14.9
41.3
26.4
13.5
0.0
87.3
69.7
52.8
42.1
126
62.4
33.2
31.6
Source: Author's calculations. Sample taken from the 1993 Merrill Lynch Household Survey.
cial vulnerabilities, and that they save too little. It is natural to conjecture
that these phenomena are related. If so, then there is reason to hope that
behavior is responsive to education. I discuss direct evidence on the
relation between education and behavior below. Here, I consider an
intermediate question: does greater financial knowledge tend to pro-
mote more adequate saving?
There is, without any question, a powerful quantitative relation be-
tween economic knowledge and personal saving. As shown in Table 7, the
median ratio of retirement savings to earnings for those receiving the
highest test scores (those in the fourth quartile) was roughly two-and-
a-half times as large as the median ratio of retirement savings to earnings
for those receiving the lowest test scores (those in the first quartile).
Similarly, the typical individual who describes him/herself as "very finan-
cially knowledgeable" has accumulated more than three times as much
as the typical individual who describes him/herself as "only a little finan-
cially knowledgeable." Moreover, among those who consider themselves
"not at all financially knowledgeable," the median individual has ac-
cumulated nothing for retirement. Similar patterns are observed for
sample means.
These results do not, however, establish that individuals save more in
response to the acquisition of economic knowledge. They are equally
consistent with the possibility that individuals acquire economic knowl-
edge after accumulating significant wealth, in order to manage their
resources with greater competence. As observed above, people may pay
little attention to mortgage rates until they have accumulated sufficient
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resources to purchase a house, and they may begin to follow the Dow
Jones average only after making significant investments in the stock mar-
ket. Consequently, the direction of causality in Table 7 is far from clear,
and requires further analysis.
Although the accumulation ofwealth provides one possible motivation
for the acquisition of financial knowledge, the level of knowledge pre-
sumably varies significantly across the population for other reasons as
well. Ifone can identify a portion of the variation in financial literacy that
does not result from differences in wealth, then it should be possible to
distinguish between the hypothesis that knowledge causes the accumula-
tion of wealth, and the hypothesis that wealth causes the acquisition of
knowledge. This is done through the use of an instrumental variable. In
this context, an instrumental variable must be correlated with financial
literacy, but must not itself be affected by wealth.
Above, I also noted that, although financial test scores are strongly
related to earnings, macroeconomic test scores are not. This result is
intuitive, since those with greater resources do not necessarily have
a greater incentive to acquire macroeconomic knowledge. Neverthe-
less, the correlation between financial knowledge and macroeconomic
knowledge is extremely high. Thus, an individual's macroeconomic test
score is a plausible instrument for his or her financial test score.
Table 8 contains the results of two regressions that explain a measure
of retirement wealth as a function of demographics, economic charac-
teristics, and financial knowledge. '3 In the first of these, the potential
endogeneity of the respondent's financial test score is ignored. As ex-
pected, there is a strong positive relation between wealth and the test
score, even when one controls for a range of other household char-
acteristics; however, this finding is consistent with the hypothesis that
wealth causes the acquisition of financial knowledge. In the second
regression, I treat the endogeneity of the financial test score by re-
estimating the specification using two-stage least squares, where mac-
roeconomic test score serves as the instrument. Note that the estimated
effect of education is actually stronger in the second (instrumented)
equation than in the first. Thus, a strong relation between wealth and
financial knowledge persists even when the causal effects ofwealth on the
acquisition of knowledge are removed.
The relative sizes of the coefficients on the financial test score variable
may at first seem surprising. Even if knowledge does affect saving, one
might expect to observe a weaker relation between wealth and knowl-
edge after using an instrumental variable to remove some of the factors
that cause these variables to be related. However, one must also recall that
the respondent's financial test score measures actual financial knowl-
edge with error. For standard econometric reasons, this measurement
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TABLE 8 Regression Analysis Explaining a Measure ofAccumulated Retirement
Wealth
Explanatary variable Ordinary least squares Tw(}-stage least squares
estimates estimates
Financial test score 4.26 7.26
(1.35) * (2.94)'
Married 0.266 0.130
(0.565) (0.579)
Single male 0.005 -0.143
(0.657) (0.672)
Black 0.109 0.270
(0.881) (0.896)
Respondent's age 0.040 0.0412
(0.028) (0.0282)
Number of children -0.206 -0.219
(0.140) (0.141)
Household earnings x 106 3.23 2.45
(3.18) (3.27)
High school only 1.34 1.20
(1.00) (1.01)
High school plus 1.53 1.24
(0.99) (1.02)
College degree 2.82 2.37
(1.00) * (1.08)'
Constant -9.69 -11.4
(1.73)* (2.28)*
SoUTce: Author's calculations. Sample taken from the 1993 Merrill Lynch Household Survey.
Notes: The dependent variable is In[ (RS + 1) / (EARN + I)], where In is the natural log. RS
is the stock of retirement savings, and EARN is total annual household earnings. I take logs
in recognition of me fact mat the distribution of wealth is extremely skewed, in order to
reduce the influence of outliers. I add 1 to the numerator and denominator to assure that
the argument is stricLly positive. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Statistical Significance: * = I % level, t = 5% level.
error biases the coefficient of financial knowledge toward zero. The use
of an instrument treats both the endogeneity problem and the measure-
ment error problem. Since these effects work in opposite directions, the
coefficient of financial test score could, in theory, either rise or fall; in
practice, it rises.
While these finding are consistent with the hypothesis that greater fi-
nancial knowledge stimulates saving, my analysis has not proven causality.
Even if there is no direct causal relation (in either direction) between
macroeconomic knowledge and wealth, it is possible that these two vari-
ables are both systematically related to some unobserved third factor (e.g.,
the respondent's innate interest in economic issues). For this reason, it is
particularly important to examine the effects ofeducation directly.
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Do Households Obtain Authoritative Advice
and Guidance?
The fact that households are ill equipped to formulate complex, long-
term financial plans does not necessarily imply that they will make poor
decisions. In principle, individuals can seek advice and guidance from a
variety of qualified sources, including professional financial planners. In
practice, the market for professional guidance is highly imperfect (see
Bernheim 1994b for a discussion of the reasons). Consequently, there is
no reason to assume that the mere availability of qualified assistance
translates into high-quality decision making. In this section, I examine
empirical evidence concerning the extent to which households rely on
different forms ofguidance.
Table 9 summarizes data from the 1993 Merrill Lynch household sur-
vey concerning the relative importance of the five most common sources
of financial information and advice (parents and other relatives, friends,
personal judgment, financial professionals, and print media) .14 Ai; in
previous sections, the data are disaggregated by age, gender, race, educa-
tion, and earnings. A number of interesting patterns are readily appar-
ent. Younger baby boomers tend to rely more on parents and relatives
and less on their personal judgment. The use of financial professionals
appears to peak between ages 35 and 40. For women, parents and rela-
tives are by far the dominant source of financial information and advice.
In contrast, for men, parents and relatives rank third behind personal
judgment, but these differences may not be representative given the
small size of the black subsample. Surprisingly, college-educated individ-
uals are, if anything, slightly less likely to rely on their own personal
judgment. Parents and relatives are also less important as sources of
financial information and advice for those with college degrees. College
education and earnings are both correlated with greater reliance on
financial professionals and print media. Those with higher earnings also
tend to seek less information and advice from friends. Although those in
the lowest earnings quartile rely to a much greater extent on personal
judgment, and to a lesser extent on parents and relatives, earnings bear
little systematic relation to the use of these sources beyond the lowest
quartile.
Given the general state of financial literacy, it is worrisome that so many
individuals rely primarily on their ownjudgment. In the majority ofcases,
reliance on parents, relatives, and friends amounts to the blind leading
the blind. It is therefore noteworthy that somewhere in the neighbor-
hood of60 percent ofvirtually every population subgroup relies primarily
on parents, relatives, friends, and personal judgment. The fraction rely-
ing on financial professionals and print media does not exceed 40 per-
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TABLE 9 Primary Sources of Financial Information and Advice
Parents/ Friends Personal Financial Print
relatives judgment professional media
Population subgroup (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Age
29-34 34.9 7.8 22.6 9.1 17.7
35-40 27.1 6.3 25.6 16.5 17.3
41-47 23.0 8.0 29.3 11.1 20.2
Gender
Male 21.5 7.2 29.9 11.5 23.8
Female 34.6 7.7 22.2 13.1 13.3
Race
White 28.0 7.6 24.9 13.3 20.0
Black 36.4 0.0 36.4 3.0 15.2
Education
College degree 23.6 9.3 24.0 15.3 23.3
No college degree 31.1 6.2 27.3 10.4 15.3
Earnings
First quartile 24.7 10.9 32.2 9.2 10.3
Second quartile 29.5 11.0 18.5 12.1 19.1
Third quartile 27.2 5.8 26.6 11.6 21.4
Fourth quartile 29.5 4.6 23.1 15.6 24.3
Source: Author's calculations. Sample taken from the 1993 Merrill Lynch Household Survey.
cent for any population subgroup. Thus, it seems likely that most indi-
viduals lack an authoritative, reliable source of information and advice,
The Effects of Retirement Education in the Workplace
At this point, it is useful to summarize a number of key findings. Most
Americans are not making adequate financial preparations for their fu-
tures. As a result, financial vulnerabilities are widespread. Poor financial
planning tends to be associated with a failure to appreciate these vulner-
abilities. Households generally exhibit an excessive degree of optimism
concerning their financial status, This perceptual failure may reflect a
more general problem of financial illiteracy. Although those with high
earnings and college degrees tend to obtain higher scores for financial
literacy, their scores still indicate substantial deficiencies. Finally, most
households do not compensate for the lack of financial decision-making
skills by seeking and obtaining assistance from qualified authorities.
In the past few years, numerous companies-particularly those that
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sponsor participant-<iirected plans - have moved to bridge the financial
literacy gap by offering retirement education programs. In light of the
evidence developed in the preceding sections, it is conceivable that these
programs could have a significant impact on behavior. In this section, 1
review some of the existing evidence on this topic, and provide some new
evidence.
Previous Studies
Much of the evidence on the effects of retirement education in the work-
place is derived from qualitative surveys and case studies. According to
Milne et 'II. (1995),92 percent of 401 (k) participants say that they read
materials provided by their employers; of those, 44 percent say that they
allocate their funds differently, and 33 percent say that they contribute
more to their plans. Employers who enhanced their educational efforts
also tend to report increases in participation (A. Foster Higgins & Co.,
Inc. 1994), and case studies frequently cite dramatic changes in behavior
(Milne et 'II. 1995; Borleis and Wedell 1994) .
Two recent studies provide formal econometric evidence on the effects
of employer-based retirement education. One analysis, by Bernheim and
Garrett (1996), is based on a fall 1994 Merrill Lynch household survey of
roughly 2,000 individuals between the ages of 30 and 48. The authors
examine the relations between various measures of saving and two key
educational variables. The first measures whether the respondent's em-
ployer offers some sort of retirement education program, while the sec-
ond indicates whether the respondent actually makes use of the program.
Conceptually, it may seem more appropriate to control for participa-
tion in educational programs, rather than the mere availability of such
programs. The authors are concerned, however, about the possible ef-
fects of endogeneity. They provide various kinds of evidence in support
of the proposition that education tends to be adopted as a remedial
measure, and therefore is negatively correlated with factors th'lt pre-
dispose respondents to save more. This means that cross-sectional rela-
tions between saving and the availability of education are probably con-
servative, in the sense that they understate the causal effect of education.
It is conceivable, however, that the usage of education, conditional on
availability, is positively correlated with the inclination to save. This could
produce a spurious positive correlation between saving and educational
usage.
Bernheim and Garrett's measures of employer-based retirement edu-
cation are obviously coarse. Unfortunately, the 1994 Merrill Lynch house-
hold survey did not gather detailed descriptions of program structure
and content. One must therefore view their study as an investigation of
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TABLE 10 The Effects of Retirement Education in the Workplace: Results Based
on a Survey of Households
Availability ofeducatilm,
incremental effect
Usage ofeducation,
incremental effect
Total saving rate (%)
First quartile 1.29* 1.83*
Median 1.65* 2.18*
Third quartile 0.82 1.04
Retirement saving rate (%)
First quartile 0.60t 1.50*
Median 0.92* 1.83*
Third quartile 0.94 1.62*
RespondRnt's 401(k)
Participation rate (%) 11.8* 19.5*
Balances, first quartile 1,113t 2,161 *
Balances, median 2,5081 2,826*
Balances, third quartile 6,084t 2,714
Spouse's 401(k)
Participation rate (%) 9.5t 8.0t
Balances, first quartile 1,0221 1,069*
Balances, median 420 1,205
Balances, third quartile 466 436
Source: Bernheim and Garrett (1996). Sample taken from the 1994 Merrill Lynch House-
hold Survey.
Notes: Effects on saving rates and participation rates are measured in percentage points.
Statistical significance: * = 99% level, t = 95% level, ' = 90% level.
the average effects of educational activities: it probably understates the
effects of the best programs,
Key findings from Bernheim-Garrett are summarized in Table 10, Sev-
eral robust patterns emerge, One is that the availability of education has
a powerful effect on the typical respondent, raising the median total
saving rate by 1,65 percent of income. This reflects a 28 percent increase
over the median saving rate among those who do not have access to
retirement education in the workplace (6 percent of income), Similarly,
the median retirement saving rate rises by 0,92 percent of income, which
is a 31 percent increase over the median retirement saving rate among
those without access to employer-based retirement education (3 percent
of income), Finally, median 401 (k) balances increase byjust over $2,500,
which represents a 50 percent increase over median 401 (k) balances
among those without access to retirement education ($5,000), These
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effects represent large proportional changes, relative to those for whom
education is unavailable.
Another conclusion is that the estimated effects for usage ofeducation
are generally greater than those for availability. This stands to reason.
However, it is worth reiterating that one should exercise caution when
interpreting the results for usage. Perhaps the strongest results (both in
terms of proportional effect and in terms of statistical significance) are
obtained for those who are least inclined to save (i.e., at the first saving
quartile of the population distribution). In contrast, little or no effect is
usually detected among those who are most inclined to save (i.e., those at
the third quartile). This is exactly what one expects to find. If education
nudges each household toward an appropriate mode of behavior, its
impact on low and average savers should bear little resemblance to its
impact on high savers; even the sign of the effect could be different. One
exception is the substantial positive effect of educational availability on
respondents' 401 (k) balances among high savers ($6,084). It is particu-
larly interesting that a stronger result is obtained for availability than for
usage ($2,714). There is, however, a natural explanation. High savers may
be constrained by plan limits on 401 (k) contributions that are necessi-
tated by nondiscrimination requirements. If education induces other
employees to contribute more, then the respondent can contribute more
as well, irrespective of whether he or she makes use of the education.
Under this hypothesis, the primary factor determining the effect of edu-
cation on 401 (k) contributions at the third quartile would be availability,
rather than usage, exactly as the results indicate.
Additional results illustrate that education has a particularly powerful
effect on rates of participation in 401 (k) plans. This is consistent with
other findings indicating that education is most effective at modifying
the behavior of those who are least inclined to save. Finally, the avail-
ability (and usage) of education at the respondent's workplace appears
to have positive spillovers on choices made in the context of a spouse's
401 (k) plan. The effects are, however, smaller than for respondents, and
only statistically significant among those least inclined to save (i.e., at the
first quartile, and for participation rates).
A second study, by Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz (1996), analyzes em-
ployer surveys fielded by KPMG Peat Marwick in 1993 and 1994. KPMG
Peat Marwick annually surveys roughly 1,000 plan sponsors, approxi-
mately half of which have 401 (k) plans. There is an effort to survey the
same firms in consecutive years, so it is possible to use the surveys as a
short panel. The analysis of employer survey data is complementary to
Bernheim and Garrett's (1996) use of household survey data. With em-
ployer survey data, one cannot investigate the effects of education on
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TABLE 11 The Effects of Frequent Retirement Seminars in the Workplace:
Results Based on a Survey of Employers
Incremental impact oj Non-highly Highly
frequent seminars on: compensated compensated AII employees
Participation rates (%)
No fixed effects 11.5* 6.4t 8.2*
Fixed effects 12.1 1 6.6 7.7:
Contribution rales (%)
No fixed effects 0.8* 0.3 0.7*
Fixed effects l.l t -O.l 0.4
Source: Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz (1996). Sample taken from the KPMG Peat Marwick
employer survey.
Nole: The coefficienL'i in this table measure the incremental effects of offering frequent
retirement seminars in the workplace. Statistical significance: * = 99% level. -t = 95% level,
: = 90% level.
saving outside of pension plans. However, offsetting this disadvantage,
one has access to more detailed data on the nature of education in
the workplace, and more accurate data on choices (participation and
contributions) .
One of the key findings in Bayer-Bernheim-Scholz is that firms tend to
establish or enhance educational offerings when participation rates are
low among non-highly compensated workers. This finding supports the
hypothesis that education is generally remedial, in the sense that it is
intended to address inadequate retirement saving. As a consequence,
cros~sectionalrelations between plan activity and education will tend to
understate the effects ofeducation.
The KPMG Peat Marwick survey provides information on dle type of
education offered, as well as the frequency. Types of programs are di-
vided into print media (newsletters, plan descriptions, etc.) and semi-
nars. There is no indication in the data that either participation or con-
tributions are affected by programs that rely on print media. However,
there is strong evidence that seminars - particularly frequent ones - are
effective.
Some of the central findings of Bayer-Bernheim-Scholz are summa-
rized in Table 11. All results are based on the pooled 1993 and 1994
samples. In addition to educational seminars, each regression controls
for other educational initiatives (through newsletters and summary plan
descriptions), matching rates, loan provisions, the number of investment
options offered, the existence of other pension plans, the number of
employees at the firm, the fraction of employees covered by the 401 (k),
and year.
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As indicated, some regressions control for firm-specific fixed effects,
while others do not. 15 Since employees' predispositions to save may differ
systematically across firms, and since (as discussed above) these predispo-
sitions may be related to the employer's decision to offer retirement edu-
cation, the inclusion of firm-specific fixed effects is potentially important.
However, since the 1993 and 1994 samples are not identical, the inclu-
sion offixed effects significantly reduces sample size. Regressions without
fixed effects are based on between 658 and 1,027 observations, while
regressions with fixed effects are based on between 147 and 291 observa-
tions. Estimates with fixed effects therefore tend to be less precise. The
inclusion of fixed effects may also increase the noise-to-signal ratio for the
educational variable (measured changes may not be actual changes),
which creates a bias that results in an understatement of the educational
effect.
The coefficients reported in Table 11 measure the effects of instituting
a program with frequent retirement seminars at a firm with no previous
educational initiatives. An examination ofthese coefficients leads to two
central conclusions. First, retirement seminars have substantial effects on
overall rates of participation and contributions. Second, these effects
appear to be concentrated among non-highly compensated employees.
Although seminars may also affect the decisions of highly compensated
employees, the evidence for this proposition is weak. The inclusion of
fixed effects does not materially alter this qualitative picture, though (as
expected) it does reduce the precision of the estimates.
Based on these estimates, one infers that the establishment offrequent
seminars raises rates of participation for non-highly compensated em-
ployees by roughly 12 percentage points. To put this figure in perspective,
consider the fact that the average participation rate among non-highly
compensated employees is 59 percent for this sample. The contribution
rate among non-highly compensated employees rises by roughly one per-
centage point (0.8 points without fixed effects, 1.1 points with fixed ef-
fects), which is large relative to an average contribution rate of 3 percent
(for the non-highly compensated) in the sample. While participation
rates for highly compensated employees rise by about 6 percentage
points (versus an average of about 80 percent for the sample), there is
little indication that education significantly affects the contribution rate
of this group. For the reasons discussed above, these findings should be
regarded as conservative.
Some New Evidence
More recently, I had an opportunity to design and administer a shon
survey to plan sponsors who attended a Merrill Lynch conference on
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401 (k)s. Surveys were mailed to the participants in advance of the con-
ference so that respondents would have access to relevant company rec-
ords. Approximately 200 employers were represented at the conference,
of which roughly 20 percent (40 companies) completed surveys. While
there is precedent in the academic literature for using small employer
surveys to examine aspects of401 (k) plans (Papke, Petersen, and Poterba
1993), it is certainly natural to wonder whether the current survey is
representative. It is possible to get some sense for this issue by comparing
responses to those obtained from broader surveys.
Reported rates of participation in 401 (k) plans averaged 71 percent,
ranging from a low of 20 percent to a high of 98 percent; 89 percent
match employee contributions, and 84 percent permit loans against plan
balances. Of those providing education (78% of the total), 97 percent
cover principles ofasset allocation, 83 percent discuss retirement income
needs, and 79 percent cover retirement income sources. All these num-
bers are similar to figures obtained from larger surveys that are regarded
as representative.
Among respondents offering education, newsletters (69%) and other
written materials (86%) were the most common forms of employee com-
munications. However, more than half (55%) used seminars, 38% pro-
vided one-{)n-one counseling, 21 percent offered interactive software,
and 16 percent sponsored participatory workshops. The most important
reasons given for offering education, both among those with programs
and among those thinking about establishing programs, were that "em-
ployees were not thinking enough about retirement" and to "increase
participation generally." This reinforces the finding that education is
remedial (and hence that cross-sectional relations between participation
and education understate the effects of education).
Table 12 reports three regressions based on this 1995 survey. The first
relates 401 (k) participation rates to the availability of education, the
availability of an employer match, the ability to take loans against plan
balances, and the vintage of the 401 (k) program (i.e., the number of
years the program has been in effect). Despite the small size of the sam-
ple, the estimated effects of education and matching provisions are large
and highly significant. Controlling for other factors, participation is, on
average, 18.5 percentage points higher in firms that offer education. The
estimated effects of matching and loan provisions are consistent with
results based on the much larger KPMG Peat Marwick surveys. The re-
gression also indicates that participation rates tend to be higher for older
programs.
As discussed above, the survey also contained information on the type
of education offered. Unfortunately, the sample size is too small to iden-
tify statistically significant differences between the effectiveness of differ-
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TABLE 12 The Effects ofRetirement Education in the Workplace:
New Regression Analysis
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable Participation rate Participation rate Change in
(%) (%) participation rate
Education 18.5 13.2 12.0
(7.6) * (8.2)! (4.8) *
High frequency 11.9
(7.6)1
Match 23.6 22.5 5.0
(9.81) * (9.6)* (4.4)
Loan -4.44 -9.1 -9.5
(9.15) (9.4) (4.5) *
Vintage 0.62 0.46
(0.35)1 (0.35)
Source: Author's calculations. Sample taken from the Merrill Lynch 401 (k) Plan Sponsor
Survey.
Note: The dependent variable is rate of participation. Effects are measured in percentage
points. Statistical significance: * = 95% level, t = 90% level, : = 85% level.
ent approaches. The one exception to this concerns the frequency of
education interventions. Nearly one-third of respondents (32%) provide
education monthly or quarterly, while 46 percent provide it at lower
frequencies. The second regression in Table 12 adds a variable that indi-
cates "high frequency" educational offerings, meaning programs with
monthly or quarterly activities. The coefficients of "education" and "high
frequency" are not estimated with a great deal of precision, owing to the
small sample size. However, these estimates do provide some support for
the view that frequency is a key determinant of impact. While the provi-
sion of low-frequency education raises participation rates on average by
13 percentage points, high-frequency education increases this rate on
average by 25 points. This qualitative pattern is consistent with results
based on the KPMG Peat Marwick survey.
The final regression in Table 12 is based on retrospective questions,
which ask whether there have been any changes in educational offerings,
matching rates, or loan provisions during the preceding five years. These
variables are coded as +1 if the firm has become more aggressive or
generous with respect to the activity in question, -1 if it has become less
aggressive or generous, and 0 if there has been no change. Firms also
reported their participation rates from five years before the survey was
taken; using this response in combination with the current participation
rate, I constructed the change in participation over a five-year period.
This final regression is of considerable interest, since it removes one
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important source of potential bias by controlling for firm fixed effects. In
some ways, it is superior to the panel estimates based on the KPMG
sample, in that it covers a longer time frame and in that differencing may
not have as large an effect on the noise-to-signal ratios for the indepen-
dent variables (since the questions on current and past plan provisions
are answered by the same individual).
The results demonstrate that changes in education are strongly related
to changes in participation. This finding is broadly consistent with the
result obtained from cross-sectional estimates. Notably, the coefficient of
education proves far more robust to differencing than the coefficients of
matching provisions or loans. Once again, this result is qualitatively simi-
lar to that obtained with the KPMG Peat Marwick sample. '6
Conclusion
This chapter reviews existing evidence and presents new evidence con-
cerning the financial status of American workers. This evidence depicts a
crisis in financial planning. Most Americans are not making prudent
financial decisions. To a large extent, they are unaware of their financial
vulnerabilities, and they lack the knowledge, sophistication, and/or au-
thoritative guidance required to set them on the right track. The evi-
dence suggests that improvements in economic and financial education
and training could go a long way toward encouraging greater saving.
APPENDIX: Economic and Financial Test Questions
Financial knowledge
What is the current DowJones Industrial average?
For people who pay federal income taxes, what is the lowest income tax bracket?
What is the 30 year conventional mortgage rate right now?
Ifyou deposited $1,000 and earned 8%, compounded annually, over thirty years,
at the end of this period would you have earned more or less than $5,000?
'Nhy do mutual funds typically have higher rates of return than federally insured
bank CDS? (Options: (1) It's the law; (2) Mutualfunds are bigger; (3) Mutual
funds are riskier; (4) Inflation)
Which investment situation would you prefer: a chance to earn 8% when
inflation is at 6%, or a chance to earn 5% when inflation is at I %?
Macroeconomic knowledge
"''hat is the current national unemployment rate?
What is the national minimum wage?
What is the annual rate of inflation?
What is the size of the total federal debt?
What is the size of the total federal debt per household?
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Notes
1. Although Kotlikoff, Spivak, and Summers (1982) dispute this finding, they
attribute the adequacy of retirement preparation to an enormous unanticipated
increase in Social Security benefits, rather than to adequate saving.
2. Even if baby boomers are unable to maintain their preretirement standards
of living after retirement, they may still fare well in comparison to retirees of
previous generations. According to a study conducted by the Congressional Bud-
get Office (1993), baby boomers have significantly higher real incomes and
greater accumulated wealth than their parents did at comparable ages. King-
son (1992), Easterlin, Schaeffer. and Macunovich (1993), Cantor and Yuengert
(1994), and Yakoboski and Silverman (1994) have reached similar conclusions.
While these findings appear to suggest that baby boomers are on track to match
or exceed their parents' standard of living during retirement, caution is war-
ranted for a number ofreasons; see Bernheim (1994·c).
3. See Bernheim (1993, 1994a, 1994b). Arthur D. Little, Inc. (1993) concurs
that even those with pension plans typically will have only 50-60 percent of what
they need to retire comfortably.
4. A study by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1994) demonstrates that deep cuts in
Social Security, or steep increases in taxes, will be required to achieve long-run
fiscal balance between revenues and expenditures. Bernheim (1994a, 1995a)
analyzes the importance of these policy scenarios for the adequacy of saving by
baby boomers.
5. Shultz (1996). The article references a recently released survey of 520 plan
sponsors, conducted by RogersCasy, a pension-eonsulting firm.
6. Pensions and Investments (1995) .
7. See Bernheim (1995b) and Bernheim and Garrett (1996) for discussions of
the accuracy and representativeness of the data contained in the Merrill Lynch
household surveys.
8. The measure of wealth used in this analysis is total nonhousing wealth,
including financial assets, real property, and business interests, net of debt. For
married couples, I use the combined earnings of both spouses.
9. Formally, this is accomplished by estimating three quantile regressions (me-
dian, first quartile, and third quartile), explaining the wealth-to-earnings ratio
as a function of household characteristics. Households are then placed into
adjusted-wealth quartiles based on the relation between their actual wealth-to-
earnings ratios and the fitted ratios from the quantile regressions.
10. See for example Walstad and Soper (1988), Walstad and Larsen (1992),
Jordon (1993), the Consumer Federation of America and the American Express
Company (1991), and Crenshaw (1993).
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11. Suppose, for example, that we ask three individuals, A, B, and C, the same
question. Suppose that the true answer is "5," that A answers "6," B answers "8,"
and C answers "0." Then A would receive a score of 100, B would receive a score of
67, and C would receive a score of 33.
12. The test of economic knowledge contained in the Merrill Lynch survey is
obviously imperfect. Some discrepancies between self-assessed knowledge and
test scores may be attributable to subtle biases. In particular, cultural bias may
account for the disparate effects of race in Tables 3 and 6. Consider, for example,
the question on the national unemployment rate. It is well known that survey
respondents often reinterpret questions, providing answers that are more rele-
vant to their own circumstances. Blacks might well report an unemployment
figure that is accurate for blacks, but not for the general population. A closer
inspection of answers to this particular question reveals that, although the me-
dian rate ofunemployment reported by blacks and whites is identical (8 percent),
a far larger fraction of blacks report rates in excess of 15 percent. Thus, it appears
that a sizable minority of black respondents may be interpreting the question
differently than intended, and providing an answer that is both more relevant,
and more accurate, for their circumstances.
13. The dependent variable is In [(RS+I) / (EARN+ I)], where In is the natural
log, RS is retirement savings, and EARN is total household earnings. I take logs in
recognition of the fact that the distribution of wealth is extremely skewed, in
order to reduce the influence of outliers. I add 1 to the numerator and de-
nominator to assure that the argument is strictly positive.
14. One notable omission from this list is information disseminated by govern-
ment agencies (e.g., the Social Security Administration). As sources of infor-
mation and advice on financial planning, government sources ranked behind
" prayer," which was volunteered by a surprising number of respondents.
15. When firm-specific fixed effects are omitted, we correct the estimated stan-
dard errors by allowing for a correlation between observations on the same firm.
16. The estimated effects of education are generally larger for the Merrill
Lynch employer survey sample than for the KPMG Peat Marwick sample. It is cer-
tainly possible that firms in attendance at the Merrill Lynch conference tended to
have more aggressive education programs than the typical firm. It is also possible
that the conference sample measures vendor-specific effects. In either case, the
results suggest that the impact of the best educational programs may be signifi-
cantly larger than that of the average program, as inferred from the broader
KPMG Peat Marwick sample.
References
A. Foster Higgins & Co., Inc. "Survey of Employee Savings Plans, 1994, Report 2:
Plan Participation and Discrimination Testing." Princeton, NJ.: A. Foster Hig-
gins & Co., 1994.
Alliance Against Fraud in Telemarketing. "Top Emerging Scams of 1992." Wash-
ington, D.G: Alliance Against Fraud in Telemarketing, Winter 1992.
Arthur D. Little, Inc. "America's Retirement Crisis: The Search for Solutions."
Final Report to Oppenheimer Management Corporation,June 1993.
Auerbach, Alan]. and Laurence]. Kotlikoff. "The United States' Fiscal and Sav-
ing Crises and Their Implications for the Baby Boom Generation." Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., February 1994.
B. Douglas Bernheim 67
Bayer, Patrick]., B. Douglas Bernheim, and]. Karl Scholz. "The Effects of Finan-
cial Education in the Workplace: Evidence from a Survey of Employers." Stan-
ford, Calif.: Dept of Economics, Stanford University, mimeo, 1996.
Berg, Olena. "DOL to Launch Savings and Pension Education Campaign." EBRJ
Notes,june 1995: 2.
Bernheim, B. Douglas. "Is the Baby Boom Generation Preparing Adequately for
Retirement? Summary Report." New York: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. ,january 1993.
--. "The Merrill Lynch Baby Boom Retirement lndex." New York: Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. ,July 1994. 1994a.
--. "Personal Saving, Information, and Economic Literacy: New Directions
for Public Policy." In Charles E. Walker, Mark Bloomfield and Margo Thorn-
ing, eds. Tax PolicyforEconomic Growth in the 1990s, Washington. D.C.: American
Council for Capital Formation, 1994: 53-78. 1994b.
--. "The Adequacy of Saving for Retirement: Are the Baby Boomers on
Track?" In Dallas Salisbury and Nora S. jones, eds., Retirement in the 21st Cen-
tury: Read)' Ctr Not? Washington, D.C.: Employee Benefit Research Institute,
1994;73-82. 1994c.
--. "The Merrill Lynch Baby Boom Retirement Index: Update '95." Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., mimeo, 1995. 1995a.
--. "Do Households Appreciate Their Financial Vulnerabilities? An Analysis
ofActions, Perceptions, and Public Policy." In Tax Policy and Economic Grawth in
the 1990s, Washington, D.C.: American Council for Capital Formation, 1995:
3-30. 1995b.
Bernheim, B. Douglas and Daniel M. Garrett. "The Determinants and Conse-
quences of Financial Education in the Workplace: Evidence from a Survey of
Households." Stanford, Calif. Department of Economics: Stanford University,
mimeo, 1996.
Borleis, Melvin W. and Kimberly K Wedell. "How to Spark Employee Interest
with Employer Matching Contributions." Profit Sharing,january 1994: 7-16.
Cantor, Richard and Andrew Yuengert. "The Baby Boom Generation and Aggre-
gate Savings." New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, mimeo, 1994.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). "Baby Boomers in Retirement: An Early
Perspective." ACBO Study, Washington, D.C., September 1993.
Consumer Federation of America and the American Express Company. "High
School Competency Test Report of Findings." Working Paper, Washington,
D.C., 1991.
Crenshaw, Albert B. "For Too Many, Managing Money Isn't Child's Play." Wash-
ingtonPost, October 3,1993: BI-B3.
Diamond, Peter A. "A Framework for Social Security Analysis." Journal ofPublic
Economics 8, 3 (December 1977); 275-98.
Easterlin, Richard A., Christine M. Schaeffer, and Diane]. Macunovich. "Will the
Baby Boomers Be Less Well Off Than Their Parents? Income, Wealth, and
Family Circumstances over the Life Cycle." Los Angeles: University of South-
ern California, mimeo, 1993.
Faber, R. and T. O'Guinn. "Compulsive Consumption and Credit Abuse. "Jaurnal
ofConsumer Policy II (1989): 97-109.
Feenberg, Daniel and Jonathan Skinner. "Sources of IRA Saving." Tax Policy and
the Econamy (1989); 25-46. V3
Hamermesh, Daniel S. "Consumption During Retirement: The Missing Link in
the Life Cycle." Review ofEcCtnomics and Statistics 66, 1 (February 1984): 1-7.
68 Finane/alllllteracy, Education, and Retirement Saving
Milne, Deborah, Jack Vanderhei and Paul Yakoboski. "Can We Save Enough to
Retire? Participant Education in Defined Contribution Plans." EBRIIssue Brief
No. 160: Washington, D.C.: Employee Benefits Research Institute, April 1995:
3-23.
Hira, Tahira K "Financial Management Knowledge and Practices: Implications
for Financial Health." Iowa State University, mimeo, 1993.
Jordan, Mary. "90 Million Lack Simple Literacy." Washington Post, September 9,
]993: A], AS.
Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky. Judgment Under Uncertainty:
HeU1istics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ]982.
Kingson, Eric. "The Diversity of the Baby Boom Generation: Implications for
Their Retirement Years." American Association of Retired Persons, Mono-
graph, Washington, D.C., April ]992.
Kotlikoff, Laurence, StevenJohnson, and William Samuelson. "Can People Com-
pute? An Experimental Test of the Life Cycle Consumption Model." NBER
Working Paper No. 2183, 1987.
Kotlikoff, Laurence, Avia Spivak, and Laurence Summers. "The Adequacy of
Savings." American Economic Review 72,5 (December 1982): ]056-69.
Levin, Laurence. "Are Assets Fungible? Testing Alternative Theories ofLife-Cycle
Savings." Santa Clara, Calif.: Santa Clara University, mimeo, 1992.
O'Neill, Barbara. How Real Peopk Handk Their Money: 35 Financial Planning Case
Studies. New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers Cooperative Extension Publications,
1990.
--. "Assessing America's FinanciallQ: Realities, Consequences, and Potential
for Change." Rutgers Cooperative Extension, mimeo, 1993.
Papke, Leslie E., Mitchell Petersen, and James M. Poterba. "Did 401 (k) Plans
Replace Other Employer Provided Pensions?" NBER Working Paper No. 4501,
October 1993.
Pensions and Investments. "Employees Getting More: Investment Education, Plan-
ning Help on the Increase." January 23, 1995: 74.
Schultz, Ellen E. "Executives See Trouble in Employee's Nest Eggs." WaU Street
Journal, March 27, 1996: CI.
Shefrin, Hersh and Richard Thaler. "Life Cycle vs. Self-Control Theories of Sav-
ing: A Look at the Evidence." Unpublished mimeo, 1983.
--. "The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis." Economic Inquiry 26 (1988): 609-
43,
Walstad, William B. and Max Larsen. "A National Survey of American Economic
Literacy." National Council on Economics Education, Monograph, Washing-
ton, D.C.,July 1992.
Walstad, William B. andJohn C. Soper. "A Report Card on the Economic Literacy
of U.S. High School Students." American Economic Review 78, 2 (May 1988):
251-56.
Warshawsky, Mark. "Sensitivity to Market Incentives: The Case of Policy Loans."
Review ofEconomics and Statistics 69,2 (May 1987): 286~95.
Yakoboski, Paul and Celia Silverman. "Baby Boomers in Retirement: What Are
Their Prospects?" EBRI Special Report and Issue Brief No. 151. Washington, D.C.:
Employee Benefits Research Institute,July 1994.
